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Forensic Linguistics: Science or Fiction?
ABIGAIL SHIM†
The history of linguistics is meager and splintered due to the subject’s interdisciplinary nature.
In the postwar era, the discipline attempted to revive as a scientific one, spearheaded by Noam
Chomsky and his theory of generative grammar. Linguistics consequently broke away from the
predominant structuralist approach of the nineteenth century, returning to rationalist roots. But
with the rise of computer technology, Chomsky’s critiques of empirical, applicational linguistic
approaches have lost their force. As academic linguistics splinters off again, loses its scientific
edge, and regroups with the humanities, linguistics applied in the forensic context may implicate
more questions than it answers, fundamental questions about humans and language that
linguists are still unable to solve: What is language? Do we use language in a way that is
uniquely identifiable? Should we look at language use from a societal or individualized,
psychological perspective? This Note seeks to reveal these tensions, by providing an overview
of the historical development of forensic linguistics; highlights the theory of idiolect backing the
use of forensic linguistic evidence; and critiques idiolect and forensic linguistics’ statistical turn
in light of linguistics’ ebbing scientific status. As the larger epistemological questions behind
forensic linguistic theory remain indeterminate, authorship identification may remain a question
of weight, similarity, and difference for judges and juries to grapple with, highlighting the
“sliding scale” problem of reliability in the forensic sciences.

† J.D. Candidate, 2023, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; Editor-in-Chief, Hastings
Law Journal. I am wholly indebted to Professor Binyamin Blum, whose brilliant teaching and guidance
incubated this Note. I am also immensely grateful for the exceptional work of Jesse Honig, Executive Notes
Editor; Nikol Nesterenko, Executive Technology Editor; Arlen Moradi and Isabella Ysebrands, Executive
Production Editors; Sam Dodson, Senior Production Editor; and our indispensable staff editors. Any remaining
errors or omissions are my own.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1989, Robin Lakoff, a linguist at the University of California, Berkeley,
offered unsettling reflections on the present state of linguistics:
Suppose the social ‘sciences’ in general, and linguistics in particular, have yet
to demonstrate the appropriateness of the scientific method to their subject
matter, the working of the human mind. Suppose a large part of the work of
this field is . . . still humanistic at heart: dedicated to figuring out what is
individual . . . and therefore beyond the reach of statistics, of replicable
experimentation. Then what happens if we graft the argumentative techniques
that work so well for science upon a humanistic study? What will we get?
Modern linguistics, I suggest—to its misfortune . . . .1

She reaffirmed these views in 2000, characterizing the field as a social
rather than hard science in her book The Language War,2 which seeks to use
discourse analysis to “make a true rapprochement” between linguistics and other
social sciences like literary analysis, psychology, anthropology, and political
science.3 She candidly admits that by doing so, she engages not with what is
considered “linguistics,” but “contemporary psychoanalysis and literary
theory”;4 that linguistics proper rejects her approach as unscientific;5 and that
there is “no extrinsic, objective, ‘scientific’ test” by which to verify or falsify
her claims.6 She then reiterates the broader question raised in her 1989 memoir:
“Are interpreters of human communication . . . engaged in scientific or
humanistic enterprise?”7
Yet in 1997, Lakoff submitted an affidavit on behalf of Theodore
Kaczynski supporting a motion to suppress seized writings linking him with the
infamous Unabomber.8 Lakoff’s affidavit challenged the FBI’s assessment of
the “shared linguistic analysis” between Kaczynski’s and the Unabomber’s
writings,9 with unmistakable irony: a professional linguist unconvinced of the
scientific rigor of her discipline offered her expertise to attack the lack of rigor
in the opposing side’s linguistic methodology. While it remains unclear whether
Lakoff’s findings would have been admissible at trial,10 this anecdote illustrates
the troubling dichotomy reflected in the history of forensic linguistics.

1. Robin Lakoff, The Way We Were; or; the Real Actual Truth About Generative Semantics: A Memoir,
13 J. PRAGMATICS 939, 967 (1989).
2. ROBIN TOLMACH LAKOFF, THE LANGUAGE WAR 5 (2000).
3. Id. at 5, 8 (defining “discourse analysis” as the analysis of the “processes by which we understand
larger and more abstract units of language”).
4. Id. at 6.
5. Id. at 8.
6. Id. at 9–10.
7. Id.
8. LAWRENCE M. SOLAN & PETER M. TIERSMA, SPEAKING OF CRIME: THE LANGUAGE OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 162 (2005).
9. Id. at 163.
10. Id. at 164.
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Forensic linguistics emerged only recently in the 1990s from the
fragmentation of linguistics proper after the “Chomskyan revolution” of the
1960s11 as one of many liaisons between linguistics and other social sciences.12
While linguistics lost its dominance and internal unity, 13 linguistic evidence
increasingly found its way into the courts. 14 To this day, some of forensic
linguistics’ foremost advocates are lawyers with PhDs in linguistics who focus
exclusively on the intersection between linguistics and the law.15
In forensic linguistics’ earliest stages, experts testified exclusively on an
experiential basis, picking out idiosyncratic usage in the unidentified document
to identify the author—much like handwriting experts 16 —and their methods
were not considered “scientific.”17 With the advent of sophisticated computer
modeling and a growing attention to corpus linguistics, 18 however, forensic
linguistic techniques may experience a revival in authorship attribution cases.19

11. Roger Shuy, Language and Law, in THE HANDBOOK OF LINGUISTICS 627, 627 (Mark Aronoff & Janie
Rees-Miller eds., 2d ed. 2017); PETER H. MATTHEWS, A SHORT HISTORY OF STRUCTURAL LINGUISTICS 25
(2001).
12. Lakoff, supra note 1, at 964.
13. Ernst F.K. Koerner, On the Place of Linguistic Historiography Within the Sciences of Language, Again,
in ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF LINGUISTICS 3, 12 (E.F.K. Koerner ed., 2004).
14. See Shuy, supra note 11 (“[N]ow linguists are applying their field’s knowledge to such areas as
statutory law and interpretation, voice and authorship identification, jury instructions, the asymmetry of power
in courtroom exchanges, lawyer-client communication, police interrogation practices, contract disputes, legal
discourse, defamation, trademark infringement, courtroom interpretation and translation, copyright disputes,
discrimination, commercial warning messages, and various types of criminal charges such as perjury, bribery,
solicitation, money laundering, threatening, and fraud.”).
15. Lawrence M. Solan, a law professor at Brooklyn Law School, holds a PhD in linguistics from the
University of Massachusetts and has written extensively on the use of linguistic evidence in the courts. See
generally, e.g., Lawrence M. Solan, Dieter Stein & Peter M. Tiersma, Introducing Language & Law, 1 INT’L J.
LANG. & L. 1 (2012). Peter M. Tiersma was a professor at Loyola Law School and held a PhD in linguistics
from UC Berkeley. See generally, e.g., PETER M. TIERSMA, LEGAL LANGUAGE (1999); PETER M. TIERSMA,
SPEAKING OF LANGUAGE AND LAW (Lawrence M. Solan et al. eds., 1st ed. 2015). Janet Ainsworth is a professor
of law at Seattle University. See generally, e.g., Janet Ainsworth, Who Wrote This? Modern Forensic Authorship
Analysis as a Model for Valid Forensic Science, 96 WASH. L. REV. 1159 (2019) [hereinafter Ainsworth, Who
Wrote This?]. Roger Shuy is a retired professor of linguistics at Georgetown University who has written
numerous works on forensic linguistics. See generally Shuy, supra note 11. He also testified as Quality Inn’s
linguistic expert in the “McSleep” trademark case. See generally Quality Inns Int’l v. McDonald’s Corp., 695 F.
Supp. 198 (D. Md. 1988).
16. See generally, e.g., DON FOSTER, AUTHOR UNKNOWN: TALES OF A LITERARY DETECTIVE (2000); JOHN
OLSSON, WORD CRIME: SOLVING CRIME THROUGH FORENSIC LINGUISTICS (2009).
17. See, e.g., United States v. Van Wyk, 83 F. Supp. 2d 515, 523 (D.N.J. 2000) (identifying the “lack of
scientific reliability of forensic stylistics,” a method that compares shared features and differences between sets
of documents based on the examiner’s experience and personal observation).
18. “Corpus linguistics,” broadly defined, refers to “the study of language based on examples of real-life
language use,” typically by analyzing a collected dataset of speech. TONY MCENERY & ANDREW WILSON,
CORPUS LINGUISTICS: AN INTRODUCTION 1 (2d ed. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted).
19. Moshe Koppel, Jonathan Schler & Shlomo Argamon, Computational Methods in Authorship
Attribution, 60 J. AM. SOC’Y INFO. SCI. & TECH. 9, 9 (2009) (“More recently, this problem of authorship
attribution has gained greater prominence due to new applications in forensic analysis . . . and the development
of computational methods for addressing the problem.”); see also United States v. Clifford, 704 F.2d 86, 90–91
(3d Cir. 1983) (recognizing a linguistic expert’s computerized, frequency-based comparison of writings as a
“scientific process”).
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Thanks to these developments, linguistic expert evidence has become
a mainstay in trademark cases,20 a rising force in statutory and constitutional
interpretation, 21 and the occasional appearance in authorship identification
cases.22 Yet the divergent uses, methodologies, and admissibility of linguistic
evidence may reflect deeper divides within linguistics proper surrounding
metaphysical questions of meaning and the mind.23 And if various linguistic
factions trenchantly disagree on a foundational theoretical basis, the question
becomes whether forensic linguistic methodologies are truly “reliable.”24
This Note traces the historical development of forensic linguistics to
question the subliminal, classically forensic theory behind applying linguistic
methodologies in authorship identification cases—namely, that each person has
a distinct use of language by which they can be identified.25 By reducing the
study of language to corpus linguistic techniques slapped onto a patently
forensic theory of language use, forensic linguistic evidence masquerades
behind the appearance of empirical rigor, casting doubt upon its reliability as
existing apart from the courts.26
Part I traces the historical emergence of forensic linguistics around the
1990s27 with the downfall of the Chomskyan hegemony and the fragmentation
of linguistics proper. It would be impossible to provide a comprehensive history,
given the scope of this Note. But identifying several themes from certain
chapters in linguistic history will illuminate issues with the use of linguistic
evidence in the courts, particularly in the authorship identification context. Part
II traces parallel developments in the admissibility of linguistic evidence in
authorship identification cases. Finally, Part III challenges the theory of idiolect
backing the use of forensic linguistic evidence in authorship identification cases
in light of linguistics’ broader historical development.

20. ROGER W. SHUY, LINGUISTIC BATTLES IN TRADEMARK DISPUTES 23 (2002).
21. See generally, e.g., Thomas R. Lee & Stephen C. Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, 127 YALE
L.J. 788 (2018); Stephen C. Mouritsen, Hard Cases and Hard Data: Assessing Corpus Linguistics as an
Empirical Path to Plain Meaning, 13 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 156 (2011); Jennifer L. Mascott, Who Are
Officers of the United States, 70 STAN. L. REV. 443 (2018).
22. SOLAN & TIERSMA, supra note 8, at 151.
23. Koerner, supra note 13, at 7 (“[L]inguistics [is] a discipline in which the coexistence of diverging
theoretical views and possibly contrasting methodological procedures constitutes perhaps the most important
element . . . .”).
24. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590–95 (1993).
25. JOHN GIBBONS, FORENSIC LINGUISTICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO LANGUAGE IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 297
(2003).
26. Jennifer Mnookin, Scripting Expertise: The History of Handwriting Identification Evidence and the
Judicial Construction of Reliability, 87 VA. L. REV. 1723, 1728–29 (2001) [hereinafter Mnookin, Scripting
Expertise].
27. See Malcolm Coulthard, Author Identification, Idiolect, and Linguistic Uniqueness, 25 APPLIED
LINGUISTICS 431, 431 (2004).
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I. THE HISTORY OF FORENSIC LINGUISTICS
A. METHODOLOGY
There are several significant challenges to conducting a historical survey
of linguistics. The historiography of linguistics itself is as young as the
emergence of linguistics as an independent discipline,28 and there is a deficiency
of scholarly work on the subject.29 Moreover, because the history of linguistics
is a narrative of “diverging theoretical views and . . . contrasting methodological
procedures,” 30 there are lively debates over whether certain moments in
linguistic history should be characterized as “scientific revolutions” or as series
of continuities and discontinuities.31 Linguistic historiographic methodology is
still hotly debated, and no single “canon of [linguistic] historiographic
research . . . [has been] widely accepted by the scholarly community.”32 These
problems are even more apparent given linguistics’ loss of autonomy and
dissolution into diverse subfields.33 The history of linguistics is also arguably “a
history of misreadings,” due to fundamentally differing ideological views on the
basic goals of the discipline and assumptions about how language works. 34
These challenges are somewhat curbed by the constricted scope of this Part,
which focuses on the latest chapter of linguistic history following the
“Chomskyan revolution.”35
Additionally, this Part focuses on Anglo-European linguistic traditions, for
several reasons. First, it is “European science that has become international
science,” including in the realm of linguistics.36 Second, the developing tradition
of European linguistics from Hellenistic antiquity has been relatively linear and
28. Ernst F.K. Koerner, Toward a History of Americanist Linguistics, in TOWARD A HISTORY OF AMERICAN
LINGUISTICS 17, 18 (2002).
29. Koerner, supra note 13, at 5, 7 (“It is therefore curious to note that, whereas the . . . natural sciences
have enjoyed the establishment of courses devoted to the history of their own discipline, no comparable
arrangement exists with regard to linguistics . . . .”).
30. Id. at 7.
31. See generally THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (4th ed. 2012); contra
Ernst F.K. Koerner, Continuities and Discontinuities in the History of Linguistics, in PRACTICING LINGUISTIC
HISTORIOGRAPHY: SELECTED ESSAYS 69 (E.F.K. Koerner ed., 1989); NOAM CHOMSKY, CARTESIAN
LINGUISTICS: A CHAPTER IN THE HISTORY OF RATIONALIST THOUGHT 107–08 (3d ed. 2009); JOHN EARL JOSEPH,
FROM WHITNEY TO CHOMSKY 68 (2002) (“Through all the vagaries of Neogrammarianism, structuralism, and
generativism, behaviourism and universalism, rationalism and empiricism, the path of development has
continued unbroken.”).
32. Ernst F.K. Koerner, Persistent Issues in Linguistic Historiography, in THE HISTORY OF LINGUISTICS,
1993: PAPERS FROM THE 6TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE HISTORY OF THE LANGUAGE SCIENCES
(ICHOLS VI), WASHINGTON, D.C., 9–14 AUGUST 1993, at 3–4 (Kurt R. Jankowsky ed., 1995) [hereinafter
Koerner, Persistent Issues].
33. Koerner, supra note 13, at 12.
34. JOSEPH, supra note 31, at 133; see also Koerner, Persistent Issues, supra note 32, at 6; Ernst F.K.
Koerner, Linguistics and Ideology: A Neglected Aspect of 19th and 20th Century Historiography, in LINGUISTIC
HISTORIOGRAPHY: PROJECTS & PROSPECTS 39, 54 (E.F.K. Koerner ed., 1999).
35. See generally András Kertész, From ‘Scientific Revolution’ to ‘Unscientific Revolution’: An Analysis
of Approaches to the History of Generative Linguistics, 32 LANG. SCI. 507 (2010).
36. R.H. ROBINS, A SHORT HISTORY OF LINGUISTICS 7 (1967).
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well-documented, making it reasonable “to make the history of European
linguistics the foundation for a history of linguistics as a whole,”37 if not the
complete account.
Finally, this Part focuses on two monolithic figures, Chomsky and
Saussure, and the two leading philosophies of language they espoused that
shaped modern linguistics: structuralism from the 1930s to 1950s, and
generativism from the 1960s to 1990s.38 It is from the wane of “the Chomskycentred linguistic universe” and linguistics’ corresponding breakdown into
vying subfields that forensic linguistics emerges.39
B. FROM PHILOSOPHY TO THE SCIENCE OF LANGUAGE: STRUCTURALISM AND
SAUSSURE
The fabric of nineteenth and twentieth century linguistics is convoluted,
yet defined by a key development: the discipline’s break from the humanities
and alignment with the natural sciences, thanks to the structuralist movement.40
By the nineteenth century, efforts to shift linguistics from the humanities into
the natural sciences were well underway.41 These efforts went hand in hand with
the broader modern turn to empiricism, separating philosophy from the
empirical sciences and leading to the specialization of knowledge, especially
among academic institutions.42 Previously, linguistics was simply an aspect of
subjects like philosophy, rhetoric, aesthetics, pedagogy, and philology.43 It was
linguistics’ disassociation from philosophy and achievement of scientific status
that principally allowed it to establish itself as a robust, independent discipline.44
The scientific legitimization of linguistics rode on the back of structuralism
and its foremost thinker, Saussure. Around the turn of the twentieth century,
knowledge became increasingly specialized. Intellectuals saw “the differing
nature of inquiry in the natural sciences . . . and in the human sciences,” leading
to the emergence of psychology, sociology, and political economy as
autonomous disciplines, a shift bound to powerfully impact linguistics.45 Amidst
37. Id.
38. Antonio Pennisi, The Beginnings of Psycholinguistics: Natural and Artificial Signs in the Treatment of
Language Disorders, in HISTORICAL ROOTS OF LINGUISTIC THEORIES 85, 86 (Lia Formigari & Daniele
Gambarara eds., 1995); JOSEPH, supra note 31, at 48.
39. JOSEPH, supra note 31, at 48.
40. MATTHEWS, supra note 11, at 153.
41. Lyle Campbell, The History of Linguistics, in THE HANDBOOK OF LINGUISTICS 81, 106 (Mark Aronoff
& Janie Rees-Miller eds., 2d ed. 2017).
42. Lia Formigari, Linguistic Historiography Between Linguistics and Philosophy of Language, in
HISTORICAL ROOTS OF LINGUISTIC THEORIES 1, 2 (Lia Formigari & Daniele Gambarara eds., 1995).
43. Campbell, supra note 41, at 97; Ernst F.K. Koerner, Pilot and Pirate Disciplines in the Development
of Linguistic Science, in PRACTICING LINGUISTIC HISTORIOGRAPHY: SELECTED ESSAYS 245, 246 (1989)
[hereinafter Koerner, Pilot and Pirate Disciplines].
44. Formigari, supra note 42, at 5.
45. Ernst F.K. Koerner, The Neogrammarian Doctrine: Breakthrough or Extension of the Schleicherian
Paradigm. A Problem in Linguistic Historiography, in PRACTICING LINGUISTIC HISTORIOGRAPHY: SELECTED
ESSAYS 79, 95 (1989).
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this paradigm shift, Saussure’s structuralism decisively moved linguistics into
the natural sciences and toward independence by characterizing the objective of
the discipline as the scientific study of language as a system.46
Saussure’s structuralism is defined by several important features. First,
Saussure drew a distinction between viewing language synchronically
rather than diachronically.47 A synchronic approach focuses on discerning the
universal principles of language from the study of a single language and views
language as a totality, where none of a language’s terms are viewed in isolation
apart from the system.48 This view diverged from the contemporary diachronic
approach, where linguists compared different languages to study their
historical change through time.49 In Saussure’s synchronic accounting, the goal
of linguistics was to intensively analyze an individual language in order to make
out “a pure linguistics of the language system, to which the dimension of time
and history is irrelevant.”50 This marked the rise of descriptive linguistics, or the
“study of the formal properties of language abstracted from the actuality of their
use.”51
Second, Saussure identified language as semiotic, or as a system of signs.52
Saussure believed that the “relationship between the signifier and the signified
is arbitrary,” supporting “the relative autonomy of language in relation to
reality.”53 Lastly, Saussure drew a distinction between langue, the individual
language, and parole, the communicative speech act. 54 Saussure primarily
viewed language as a social phenomenon, skirting the physical and
physiological aspects of the individual speech act and attempting instead to
discern the language system from the perspective of the community of
speakers. 55 After all, language exists in group consciousness, and individual
speech acts vary tremendously from person to person, reflecting the synchronic
view that looking at a single instance of language use outside of
the system is futile. 56 Saussure thus characterized the linguist’s objective as
understanding the langue of each community.57

46. FERDINAND DE SAUSSURE, COURSE IN GENERAL LINGUISTICS 6, 11 (1959).
47. See Joshua T. Katz, Saussure at Play and His Structuralist and Post-Structuralist Interpreters,
68 CAHIERS FERDENAND DE SASSURE 113, 121 (2015).
48. JOHN LECHTE, FIFTY KEY CONTEMPORARY THINKERS: FROM STRUCTURALISM TO POSTMODERNITY
150 (1994).
49. JOSEPH, supra note 31, at 48.
50. MATTHEWS, supra note 11, at 10; see also BORIS GASPAROV, BEYOND PURE REASON: FERDINAND DE
SAUSSURE’S PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE AND ITS EARLY ROMANTIC ANTECEDENTS 118 (2013).
51. Henry Widdowson, Disciplinarity and Disparity in Applied Linguistics, in VOICES AND PRACTICES IN
APPLIED LINGUISTICS: DIVERSIFYING A DISCIPLINE 33, 35 (Claire Wright et al. eds., 2019).
52. SAUSSURE, supra note 46, at 16.
53. LECHTE, supra note 48, at 150.
54. MATTHEWS, supra note 11, at 11–12.
55. Id. at 12; LECHTE, supra note 48, at 151.
56. LECHTE, supra note 48, at 19.
57. ROBINS, supra note 36, at 225.
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Saussure’s greatest contribution to modern linguistics was structuralizing
the study of language through formal reasoning, fencing off linguistics as an
independent, scientific discipline. As a result, linguistics became increasingly
reliant upon crafting robust, all-encompassing theories for its legitimacy and
autonomy, removing it from its prior, more practical applications of teaching
grammar and compiling dictionaries.58 This reliance on theory was pivotal, as
theory would define the according field of linguistic investigation and
methodology.59 Under Saussure’s new paradigm, “linguistics began to change
from a largely parasitic discipline, . . . a field borrowing terms, concepts, and
methods from other fields, to a pilot discipline, . . . a field of scientific
investigation offering its insights, procedures, and results to other disciplines.”60
C. INSTITUTIONALIZING LINGUISTICS
Linguistics coming into its own in both popular and intellectual
consciousness was far more than a matter of theory, however. The
discipline’s new theory-oriented goals also coincided with the growth of
universities, transatlantic European and American scholarship, and
increasing academic publication.61 While Saussure promulgated structuralism
and descriptive linguistics in Europe, American universities continued the cause
into the interwar decades in ways that would radically shape the linguistic
landscape.62
The First World War brought a “widespread sense of liberation from a
century of German linguistic dominance[,] . . . [and from] the 1920s onward a
national linguistics came to mean a more or less original theoretical position
held by a nation’s leading linguists.”63 Linguistics is thus “a relatively young
academic discipline in America . . . [and] did not fully take root in the academic
system until after World War II.” 64 As supporting evidence, the Linguistic
Society of America (LSA) and its accompanying periodical Language
were established in 1924.65 The world war efforts and an increasing sense of
globalization, accompanied by dedicated military and government funding,
helped linguistics flourish in America.66
This interest continued into the Cold War with developments in machine
translation, granting linguists funding at prestigious centers like Berkeley, MIT,
and Georgetown. 67 Thanks to linguistics’ tremendous success throughout the
58. Koerner, supra note 43, at 247.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 254.
61. ROBINS, supra note 36, at 189.
62. Id. at 235–36.
63. JOSEPH, supra note 31, at 16.
64. Janet Martin-Nielsen, A Forgotten Social Science? Creating a Place for Linguistics in the Historical
Dialogue, 47 J. HIST. BEHAV. SCIS. 147, 159 (2011).
65. Leonard Bloomfield, Why a Linguistic Society?, 1 LANG. 1, 1–5 (1925).
66. Martin-Nielsen, supra note 64, at 151–52.
67. Id. at 153.
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interwar years, the discipline experienced massive growth in the postwar era
with burgeoning departments at universities across the nation and the emergence
of professional societies like the LSA.68 While other social sciences suffered in
the politically charged climate of the times, linguistics’ myopically theoretical
focus reinforced the discipline’s “scientificization.”69 Linguistics’ mathematical
turn and the increasing association of science with academic prestige 70
supported this recharacterization.
It was in this climate that Noam Chomsky rose from MIT’s Research
Laboratory of Electronics,71 dramatically furthering these developments with a
scathing review of Skinner that spearheaded the “neo-empiricist
revolution” outmoding behaviorism, 72 reviving mentalism, and launching the
rise of cognitive science and cognitive psychology.73 With Chomsky, moreover,
began the “evolution of the American linguist as a professional figure.”74
D. THE “CHOMSKYAN REVOLUTION”
“Chomsky is currently among the ten most-cited writers in all of the
humanities (behind only Marx, Lenin, Shakespeare, the Bible, Aristotle, Plato,
and Freud) and the only living member of the top ten.”75 Chomsky’s work has
been credited as “one of the first serious attempts on the part of a linguist to
construct within the tradition of scientific theory-construction a comprehensive
theory of language which may be understood in the same sense that a chemical
[or] biological theory is ordinarily understood by experts in those fields.” 76
Hence, the next chapter of modern linguistics is often called the “Chomskyan
revolution,”77 after one of the foremost intellectuals of our time.
Before Chomsky, American structuralist linguistics was largely
behaviorist, led by Leonard Bloomfield and his incredibly influential
work, Language.78 Bloomfieldian structuralism resisted mentalism,79 positing
that language structure could only be discerned from the speech act itself, and

68. Id. at 154. See generally Archibald A. Hill, The Linguistic Society of America and North American
Linguistics, 1950–1968, 18 HISTORIOGRAPHIA LINGUISTICA 49 (1991).
69. Martin-Nielsen, supra note 64, at 162; JOSEPH, supra note 31, at 47.
70. JOSEPH, supra note 31, at 47.
71. Martin-Nielsen, supra note 64, at 153.
72. See generally Noam Chomsky, A Review of B.F. Skinner’s Verbal Behavior, in READINGS IN
PHILOSOPHY OF PSYCHOLOGY, VOLUME I, at 48–63 (Ned Block ed., 1983).
73. Martin-Nielsen, supra note 64, at 163.
74. Id. at 169.
75. STEVEN PINKER, THE LANGUAGE INSTINCT 23 (1994).
76. Robert Lees, Syntactic Structures by Noam Chomsky, 33 LANG. 375, 377 (1957) (book review).
77. See Kertész, supra note 35.
78. See generally LEONARD BLOOMFIELD, LANGUAGE (1935).
79. See generally Leonard Bloomfield, Language or Ideas?, 12 LANG. 89 (1936). “Mentalism” can be
defined as “[a]n orientation to the study of behavior, which holds that a unique, a necessary, and the primary
contribution to the causal explanation of behavior consists in proposing various internal acts, states, mechanisms
or processes, presumed to be operating in neural, conceptual, or psychic dimensions.” Jay Moore, On Mentalism,
Privacy, and Behaviorism, 11 J. MIND & BEHAV. 19, 20 (1990).
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therefore that discerning the system of language revolved around
studying stimuli and responses. 80 Whether the Chomskyan regime was the
inevitable response to Bloomfieldian behaviorism,81 and whether it was truly
a “revolution” in linguistics 82 —two hotly contested questions in linguistic
historiography 83 —Chomsky “brought fully-blown structuralism to American
linguistics for the first time,”84 reinventing American linguistics as a theoretical
science.85
In 1959, Chomsky wrote a scathing review of Skinner
that heralded the generativist turn.86 When Syntactic Structures was published
shortly thereafter,87 the shift was realized with the advent of Chomsky’s chief
contribution to linguistics: the transformational generative grammar
(TGG), a grammar 88 “generat[ing] a set of structural descriptions, each of
which . . . incorporates a deep structure, a surface structure, a semantic
interpretation (of the deep structure), and a phonetic interpretation (of the surface
structure).” 89 The “deep structure” of a given sentence refers to its units of
meaning, while the “surface structure” governs the actual words used to achieve
those meanings and their sounds. Chomsky generally avoided semantics, 90
though he intimated that the deep structure of his TGG theory could explain
derivative semantic meaning through the pairings of deep and surface structures
80. See generally Leonard Bloomfield, Secondary and Tertiary Responses to Language, 20 LANG. 45
(1944); Leonard Bloomfield, Linguistics as a Science, 27 STUD. PHILOLOGY 553 (1930); Leonard Bloomfield,
Linguistic Aspects of Science, 2 PHIL. SCI. 499 (1935); see also Leonard Bloomfield, On Recent Work in General
Linguistics, 25 MOD. PHILOLOGY 211, 212 (1927); Leonard Bloomfield, A Set of Postulates for the Science of
Language, 15 INT’L J. AM. LINGUISTICS 195, 196 (1949).
81. MARCUS TOMALIN, LINGUISTICS AND THE FORMAL SCIENCES: THE ORIGINS OF GENERATIVE
GRAMMAR 13 (2006). “Behaviorism” refers to “[a]n orientation to the study of behavior that assumes it must be
possible, in principle, to secure a full, lawful explanation of any instance of behavior, including verbal behavior,
in terms of present and past behavioral, physiological, and environmental variables, without mentioning the
realm of the mental.” Moore, supra note 79, at 22.
82. Ernst F.K. Koerner, The Chomskyan ‘Revolution’ and Its Historiography: Observations of a Bystander,
in PRACTICING LINGUISTIC HISTORIOGRAPHY: SELECTED ESSAYS 101, 134 (1989). See generally Frederick J.
Newmeyer, Has There Been a ‘Chomskyan Revolution’ in Linguistics?, 62 LANG. 1 (1986).
83. Some historians resist characterizing this chapter in linguistic history as a “revolution,” attributing
Chomsky’s dominance to his “slash and burn” treatment of previous linguistic movements, charisma, and tight
organizational control. See Ernst F.K. Koerner, On ‘Influence’ in Linguistic Historiography: Morphophonemics
in American Structuralism, in ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF LINGUISTICS 65, 69 (Ernst F.K. Koerner ed., 2004);
TOMALIN, supra note 81, at 21, 51; Lakoff, supra note 1, at 946 (disputing the accuracy of characterizing
Chomsky’s influence as a Kuhnian paradigm shift). While they are correct in the sense that Chomsky’s views
have failed to unify the discipline, his intellectual dominance in the field is nevertheless established by the fact
that contemporary linguistic developments were very much reactions to his work. See ROBINS, supra note 36, at
260, 263; Lakoff, supra, at 941.
84. JOSEPH, supra note 31, at 157; MATTHEWS, supra note 11, at 144; David Golumbia, The Language of
Science and the Science of Language: Chomsky’s Cartesianism, 43 DIACRITICS 38, 43 (2015).
85. ASA KASHER, THE CHOMSKYAN TURN 99 (1991).
86. See generally Chomsky, supra note 72.
87. See generally NOAM CHOMSKY, SYNTACTIC STRUCTURES (1957).
88. A “grammar” can be defined as the idealized system of rules governing the “ideal speaker-listener.”
NOAM CHOMSKY, ASPECTS OF THE THEORY OF SYNTAX 3 (1969).
89. NOAM CHOMSKY, LANGUAGE AND MIND 126 (1972).
90. CHOMSKY, supra note 88, at 52–53.
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and their transformational relationships.91 Instead, Chomsky based his science
of linguistics almost exclusively on syntax, 92 using complex formal trees
generated by his phrase-structure rules.93
Chomsky thus sought to find an all-encompassing theory that would
explain the basic rules of a language system, the goal of which was to account
for all possible grammatical utterances of the language-speaker’s
“competence.” 94 This was an ambitious task, given the infinite possible
grammatical uses of language and arbitrary complexity of language-users’
sentences.95 But this is also why competence—the internalized, innate language
faculty of the language-speaker—was Chomsky’s subject of analysis rather than
language “performance,” the actual, observable instances of language use. 96
Bloomfield and Saussure both struggled with the problem of language variation
between speakers. 97 Chomsky’s generative grammar sought to address this
problem by explaining variation as grounds for adjusting the rules of his
theoretical grammar. 98 Nevertheless, variation would continue to present a
recurring thorn in TGG’s side.99
Chomsky’s envisioned goal for linguistics was a marked departure from
the “controlled division of utterances into phonemes, morphemes, [and]
phrases” then dominant in America.100 Chomsky replaced behaviorism’s view
that language grammaticality was constructed from repetition and training with
the concept of a language-speaker’s creativity, which could account for how
native language users immediately understand and craft new language
formulations they have never encountered. Thus, it was not empirical data, but
a speaker’s own introspection that provided chief guidance on
91. Id. at 27, 52.
92. Golumbia, supra note 84, at 42; see also CHOMSKY, supra note 88. “Syntax” refers to how smaller
units of language (individual words) form larger units (phrases and sentences). Lakoff, supra note 1, at 941.
93. See generally CHOMSKY, supra note 88; see also TOMALIN, supra note 81, at 53. Chomsky’s phasestructure rules describe a language’s “grammar,” which attempts to comprehensively explain how meaning and
sound interact.
94. CHOMSKY, supra note 89, at 23, 102–03.
95. Id. at 105.
96. Id. at 98, 102.
97. MATTHEWS, supra note 11, at 29.
98. NOAM CHOMSKY, CURRENT ISSUES IN LINGUISTIC THEORY 54–55 (1964) (“It is necessary to distinguish
between exceptions to grammar, and counter-examples to a proposed general theory of linguistic
structure. . . . Examples that contradict the principles formulated in some general theory show that, to at least
this extent, the theory is incorrect and needs revision. Such examples become important if they can be shown to
have some bearing on alternative conceptions of linguistic structure.”).
99. See Lakoff, supra note 1, at 960.
100. MATTHEWS, supra note 11, at 98. The definitions of “morpheme” and “phoneme” and their
interrelationship are complex, endlessly debated, and far beyond the scope of this Note. See generally, e.g.,
Andreas Koutsoudas, The Morpheme Reconsidered, 29 INT’L J. AM. LINGUISTICS 160 (1963); Zellig S. Harris,
From Phoneme to Morpheme, 30 LANG. 190 (1955); Laurie Bauer, What Is a Morpheme?, in INTRODUCING
LINGUISTIC MORPHOLOGY 110–121 (2d ed. 2003). For current purposes, it suffices to define a phoneme as “a
unit of spoken language,” and a morpheme as an abstract unit comprised of “morphs,” or units that are
“segment[s] of a word-form.” William F. Twaddell, On Defining the Phoneme, 11 LANG. 5, 5 (1935); see also
Bauer, supra, at 13–17.
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grammaticality.101 Chomsky’s focus on syntax and mentalism, as opposed to
language’s external manifestations, thereby “shifted attention from . . . recorded
[corpus] data . . . to the system of knowledge . . . underl[ying] the production
and understanding of language, and, further, to the general theory of human
language . . . behind this knowledge.”102
In doing so, Chomsky “positioned his science directly in the midst of one
of the central distinctions in Western philosophical history, and one most
relevant to scientific inquiry and method: empiricism versus rationalism.” 103
Whereas Bloomfield’s conception of linguistics as a science was empirical,104
Chomsky was a rationalist after Descartes. 105 Indeed, Chomsky aligned with
“Aristotelian, a priori reasoning and opposition to experiment” as the only
proper scientific way of approaching language, completely eschewing
empirical methods.106 It is then fascinating that Chomsky’s theories dominated
the linguistic field in the second half of the twenty-first century, given their
departure from the general empirical trend in modern scientific thought.107 Yet
by aligning with a rationalist approach, Chomsky could “identify the
‘transcendental’ element [of language] . . . with the organic structure of man,”
as opposed to studying how language conditioned the speaker and the world.108
In later years, Chomsky became more explicit about his interest in language as
a gateway to the mind,109 going so far as to characterize linguistics as “simply
the subfield of psychology that deals with the aspects of [the] mind.” 110
Chomsky grew even more radical with his “Cartesian rationalism”;111 he would
eventually link language competence not only to psychology, but also to
biology, 112 a view divorced from the general humanist conceptualization of
language as a social phenomenon.
Whether or not Chomsky’s theories revolutionized linguistics, they
certainly initiated an intense focus on generating a robust theory that could
dictate linguistics’ objectives and derivative methodology. Rising above the
morass of competing theories and skirmishes over various approaches and goals
of the discipline, Chomsky’s theoretical focus continues to haunt linguistics to
this day.
101. MATTHEWS, supra note 11, at 23.
102. Campbell, supra note 41, at 111.
103. Golumbia, supra note 84, at 42.
104. ROBINS, supra note 36, at 242, 261.
105. See generally CHOMSKY, supra note 31.
106. Golumbia, supra note 84, at 42.
107. Formigari, supra note 42, at 2.
108. Id. at 5.
109. See, e.g., NOAM CHOMSKY, THE MINIMALIST PROGRAM 4 (1995).
110. CHOMSKY, supra note 89, at 25.
111. See generally James S. Fulton, The Cartesianism of Phenomenology, 35 CONT’L PHIL. REV. 433
(2002).
112. See generally Noam Chomsky, Of Minds and Language, 1 BIOLINGUISTICS 9 (2007); Noam Chomsky,
Biolinguistic Explorations, Design, Development, Evolution, 15 INT’L J. PHIL. STUD. 1 (2007); Noam Chomsky,
Universals of Human Nature, 74 PSYCHOTHERAPY & PSYCHOSOMATICS 263 (2005).
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E.

THE RETURN TO EMPIRICISM, THE BREAKDOWN OF THE CHOMSKYAN
REGIME, AND THE RISE OF FORENSIC LINGUISTICS

While Chomsky’s ideas dominated linguistic intellectual consciousness
well into the 1990s, they did not do so exclusively; other schools of linguistic
thought carried on quietly and concurrently, and Chomsky’s followers gradually
fell away and were absorbed into other subdisciplines.113 The first problems that
began to manifest cracks in Chomsky’s regime were not only his highly
controversial theories over the genetic origins of language,114 but also TGG’s
inability to comprehensively account for language variation. 115 The critiques
flowed fast and strong; there were increasing doubts over whether a single
grammar could truly account for all aspects of language, including speakerrelative concepts like intentions or assumptions.116 Some of Chomsky’s earliest
and most enthusiastic students led the first break toward generative semantics,
but this too soon devolved into various sub-approaches, including cognitive
linguistics, itself “a flexible framework rather than a single theory of
language.”117 “What began as a compact, in-house disagreement over a single
hypothesis within Chomskyan linguistics [had] mushroomed into
foundational proportions.” 118 Linguists were suddenly rehashing fundamental
issues Chomsky had supposedly put to rest, returning to old disputes over “the
definition of the . . . field, the scope of language study, [and] the answer to the
question, What is linguistics?”119
Robin Lakoff, one of Chomsky’s closest and most devoted disciples, has
attributed the split to TGG’s inevitable failure to unite the mathematicians and
logicians attracted to the theory’s formality and scientific rigor with the
humanists, who sought to discover language as a window into the mind. 120
Again, language variation was at the heart of the split. Chomsky’s grammar
simply could not account for more intricate constructions. 121 The formalist
diehards rejected such variation in their continued search for the perfect theory,
but the humanists embraced it,122 leaving Chomsky to study pragmatic intention,
discourse, and psychological influences on syntax.123 To Lakoff, the breakdown
represented a departure from “forc[ing] language into the Procrustean
113. Frederick J. Newmeyer, Outside of the Palace Walls: Generative Linguists in the 1970s and 1980s,
96 LANG. 173, 196 (2020).
114. RANDY ALLEN HARRIS, THE LINGUISTICS WARS 67 (1993).
115. Golumbia, supra note 84, at 46; Lakoff, supra note 1, at 960, 965, 981; JOSEPH, supra note 31, at 63.
116. FREDERICK J. NEWMEYER, GENERATIVE LINGUISTICS: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 118–19 (1996).
117. Dirk Geeraerts & Hubert Cuyckens, Introducing Cognitive Linguistics, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS 3, 4 (Dirk Geeraerts & Hubert Cuyckens eds., 2007).
118. HARRIS, supra note 114, at 9; see also JOSEPH, supra note 31, at 63.
119. HARRIS, supra note 114, at 7; see also Lakoff, supra note 1, at 946 (“It was not a theory-internal
conflict . . . . Rather, the disagreement was about the subject-matter of the theory: what it should encompass,
what language was.”).
120. Lakoff, supra note 1, at 944–45.
121. Id. at 960, 965.
122. Id. at 946, 964.
123. Id. at 955–56.
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bed of science.”124 In order to account for the “interconnectedness” of language,
the mind, and the world,125 linguists had to sacrifice the prized features of the
sciences: “quantification, . . . falsification, [and] replication.” 126 After a long
stint as a science, linguistics was finally unmasked as having “the focus of the
humanities but attempting the methods of the sciences.”127
Indeed, today “many linguists . . . are willing to entertain the idea of
abandoning the autonomous status of linguistics altogether, to wit Chomsky’s
proposal to develop the study of linguistic structure as a chapter of human
psychology[,] . . . thus reversing the efforts of Saussure and generations
of linguists before him.”128 Linguistics’ autonomy has ebbed as linguists have
reacted,129 much like Lakoff, back toward a humanist orientation, feeding into
the “contemporary rise of a large number of alternative
approaches to language,”130 including cognitive science,131 pragmatics,132 and
corpus linguistics.133
But there were also other problems with changing times. Chomsky
speculated that empirical research based on computation would not further “any
significant advance in our understanding of the use or nature of language.”134
Within just a few decades, however, technology had advanced to the point where
it was too tempting not to engage in the kind of empirical experimentation
Chomsky repudiated. Moreover, as linguistics rose to prominence, there was
greater interest in finding practical applications of linguistic methodology
to solve real-world problems.135 It was soon evident that linguistics’ practical
applications were at extreme tension with abstract conceptions of
competence. 136 This practical interest was bolstered by other factors like a
saturated academic job market and increasing numbers of linguists seeking

124. Id. at 985 (internal quotation marks omitted).
125. Id. at 984.
126. Id. at 985, 964.
127. Id. at 967.
128. Koerner, Pilot and Pirate Disciplines, supra note 43, at 246–47 (internal citation and quotation marks
omitted); see also ROBINS, supra note 36, at 269–70 (“All of this allows and even encourages the linguist to
concentrate his attention on some one or other module, no longer looking at language as a unitary
subject. . . . [S]pecialists will more and more direct their research and teaching to that part of the study of
language which appeals most to them . . . .”); Koerner, Persistent Issues, supra note 32, at 14 (“[W]e are
currently witnessing a diversity of views in matters concerning both general theory and the treatment of specific
aspects of linguistic analysis . . . .”).
129. ROBINS, supra note 36, at 151 (“The most obvious comment is that the discipline is no longer unified.”).
130. JOSEPH, supra note 31, at 66.
131. Id. at 69.
132. “Pragmatics” can be defined as “the study of the relation between language forms and language
function.” LAKOFF, supra note 2, at 4.
133. Id. at 177; see also supra note 18.
134. CHOMSKY, supra note 89, at 4.
135. Widdowson, supra note 51, at 33–34.
136. Id. at 39, 42.
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employment in industry, pressuring the field to give more attention to
application over theory.137
This helped shift linguists’ attention from questions relating to language
knowledge and acquisition to actual language use, transitioning linguistics
away
from
exclusively
studying
speaker-intuition
to
testing
new theoretical hypotheses against computerized data.138 Linguists moved from
typical Chomskyan, intuition-centric linguistic evidence to look at performance
data like speech errors and aphasic speech—in other words, to chiefly consider
empirical data and variation. 139 And by tracking new experimental data like
reaction-time measurement, eye tracking, and brain imaging, linguists
increasingly turned to statistical models of language structure, acquisition, and
use.140
II. LINGUISTICS AND AUTHORSHIP
IDENTIFICATION IN THE COURTS
It is difficult to chart the historical development of the admissibility of
forensic linguistic evidence, given the dearth of reported cases on its recent
emergence and yet uncertain status in the courtroom. The first to coin the term
“forensic linguistics” was linguistics professor Jan Svartvik in 1968, who was
also among the first to advocate its use in court.141 But this was not the first time
courts encountered what later came to be known as forensic stylistic evidence,
which originally cropped up in handwriting cases.
In 1901, the Supreme Court in Throckmorton v. Holt ruled that witnesses
could not corroborate contested handwriting by relying on their familiarity with
the style and composition of the alleged author.142 Nevertheless, courts freely
permitted corroborating comparisons of spelling and punctuation to determine
the author of contested handwriting.143 For example, in 1976, the Ninth Circuit
in United States v. Pheaster permitted a comparison of spelling errors to support
an opinion on the handwriting, reasoning that “[t]he manner of spelling a word
is no less an ‘identifying characteristic’ than the manner of crossing a ‘t’ or

137. Thomas Wasow, Generative Grammar: Rule Systems for Describing Sentence Structure, in THE
HANDBOOK OF LINGUISTICS 119, 137 (Mark Aronoff & Janie Rees-Miller eds., 2d ed. 2017).
138. Id.
139. KASHER, supra note 85, at 95.
140. Wasow, supra note 137, at 119, 137.
141. See generally JAN SVARTVIK, THE EVANS STATEMENTS: A CASE FOR FORENSIC LINGUISTICS (1968).
142. 180 U.S. 552, 570 (1901).
143. See, e.g., United States v. Van Wyk, 83 F. Supp. 2d 515, 523 (D.N.J. 2000) (citing United States v.
Clifford, 704 F.2d 86 (3d Cir. 1983)) (“[C]ourts uniformly have admitted evidence of known writings,
recognizing that the particular or peculiar use of grammar and spelling, for example, can be observed and
identified to establish authorship.”); Detroit Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Gagliardi, 32 P.2d 832, 838–39 (Colo.
1934) (comparing the spelling of certain words to corroborate a conclusion on handwriting); State v. Much, 287
P. 57, 61 (Wash. 1930) (similar); see also Carole E. Chaski, Forensic Linguistics, Authorship Attribution, and
Admissibility, in FORENSIC SCIENCE AND LAW: INVESTIGATIVE APPLICATIONS IN CRIMINAL, CIVIL, AND FAMILY
JUSTICE 505, 510–11 (Cyril H. Wecht & John T. Rago eds., 2006).
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looping an ‘o’[;] [a]ll may tend to identify a defendant as the author of a
writing.”144
Yet that same year, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California in United States v. Hearst excluded forensic linguistic
expert testimony in a criminal case involving the disputed authorship of certain
writings. 145 The court excluded the evidence principally on the finding that
psycholinguistics had not yet achieved general acceptance in the scientific
community. While the court made this determination under the old Frye v.
United States test,146 it also questioned the testimony’s reliability in showing “a
reasonable degree of certitude that . . . the defendant could not have authored the
writings [at issue].”147 The court also excluded the expert testimony on the basis
that it was not relevant to the key issue of the defendant’s state of mind, even if
it supported the secondary issue of authorship.148 Other courts have similarly
excluded psycholinguistic testimony going to the speaker’s intent.149
While courts have consistently rejected forensic psycholinguistic evidence,
the admissibility of forensic stylistic evidence is less settled. In 1979, Roger
Shuy sat next to a lawyer on a flight, leading Shuy to testify as an expert witness
in his first case and to eventually become the “pioneer” of forensic linguistics.150
By the 1990s, “a time of great expansion in the field of language and the law in
the US,”151 forensic linguistics had established its own academic organization,
the International Association of Forensic Linguistics, and its own journal.152 It
was also during this time, however, that a “serious rift” developed in forensic
authorship identification methodology, even as forensic linguistic evidence took
off in trademark cases.153 By 1997, the buzzy Unabomber case in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of California, a sister court of the
court that rejected the psycholinguistic expert testimony in Hearst, thrust
forensic linguistics into the national consciousness. The case has since been
144. 544 F.2d 353, 372 (9th Cir. 1976); see also United States v. Campbell, 732 F.2d 1017, 1021 (1st Cir.
1984) (emphasis omitted) (“[S]pelling may be an identifying characteristic no less than handwriting
idiosyncrasies.”).
145. 412 F. Supp. 893 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
146. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
147. Hearst, 412 F. Supp. at 895.
148. Id.
149. See, e.g., United States v. Kupau, 781 F.2d 740, 745 (9th Cir. 1986) (affirming the district court’s
exclusion of Shuy’s expert linguistic testimony on the defendant’s intent); United States v. Schmidt, 711 F.2d
595, 598–99 (5th Cir. 1983) (affirming the district court’s exclusion of psycholinguistic expert testimony going
toward the falsity of the appellant’s statements); United States v. Washington, 20 F. Supp. 3d 777, 821–22 (W.D.
Wash. 2006) (granting the motion to strike expert linguistic testimony on the ambiguity or intent of the speaker’s
language).
150. Jack Hitt, Words on Trial, THE NEW YORKER (July 16, 2012), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine
/2012/07/23/words-on-trial.
151. Lawrence M. Solan, Legal Linguistics in the US: Looking Back, Looking Ahead, in LEGAL LINGUISTICS
BEYOND BORDERS: LANGUAGE AND LAW IN A WORLD OF MEDIA, GLOBILISATION AND SOCIAL CONFLICTS 19,
20 (2019).
152. Shuy, supra note 11, at 627.
153. Solan, supra note 151, at 23.
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made into a documentary and recently experienced some revived interest.154 One
of the FBI profilers working on the case, James Fitzgerald, later became the
FBI’s first trained forensic linguist.155
Although secondary sources indicate that Shuy and others testified as
forensic stylistics experts in authorship identification cases,156 there are nearly
no reported cases, suggesting a “lack of prior judicial approval of this area of
expertise.”157 In fact, in 2000, the court in United States v. Van Wyk noted that
“no case law, treatise, or law review article has dealt with this precise issue of
whether the examination of text analysis to resolve a litigated question related
to disputed authorship . . . , or forensic stylistics, constitutes sufficiently reliable
scientific evidence admissible in court.” 158 The court then determined that
because forensic stylistics, “much like handwriting analysis,” lacks a known rate
of error, recognized standards, meaningful peer review, and a system of
accrediting experts in the field, [it] cannot “definitively establish[] . . . that a
particular person is ‘the’ author of a particular writing.” 159 Accordingly, the
court permitted Fitzgerald to testify as to similarities and differences between
the documents in question, but did not permit him to offer his opinion on their
authorship.160
Around ten years later, in another authorship identification case involving
Fitzgerald—who by this time had received a master’s degree in linguistics—the
court reached the same conclusion on the admissibility of forensic stylistic
expert testimony, despite concluding that Fitzgerald now possessed the
“requisite experience and education to qualify as an expert.”161 The defendants
attacked the reliability of Fitzgerald’s methodology, urging the court to exclude
Fitzgerald’s testimony because he failed to use scientific methods. 162 Citing
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,163 the court concluded that Fitzgerald’s methods
were valid, because their reliability could be evaluated through “personal
knowledge or experience rather than strict scientific methods.”164 Nevertheless,
as in Van Wyk, the court permitted only Fitzgerald’s testimony on similarities

154. See Unabomber - in His Own Words (Netflix, 2018); Alston Chase, Harvard and the Making of the
Unabomber, THE ATLANTIC, June 1, 2000, at 41; Jake Hanrahan, Inside the Unabomber’s Odd and Furious
Online Revival, WIRED (Jan. 8, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.co.uk/article/unabomber-netflix-tv-seriested-kaczynski.
155. Chi Luu, Fighting Words with the Unabomber, JSTOR DAILY (Aug. 1, 2017), https://daily.jstor.org
/fighting-words-unabomber/.
156. See, e.g., Hitt, supra note 150; United States v. Van Wyk, 83 F. Supp. 2d 515, 520 n.6 (D.N.J. 2000).
157. Van Wyk, 83 F. Supp. 2d at 523.
158. Id. at 520.
159. Id. at 523.
160. Id. at 524.
161. United States v. Zajac, 748 F. Supp. 2d 1340, 1349 (D. Utah 2010).
162. Id. at 1351.
163. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
164. Zajac, 748 F. Supp. 2d at 1351 (citing Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. 137).
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between the writings 165 and, by citing Kumho Tire, ostensibly discounted
Fitzgerald’s expertise as scientific.166
However, in 2020, a Florida district court in an unreported case denied the
defendant’s motion to exclude the linguistic expert testimony of Dr. Robert
Leonard.167 The court permitted Dr. Leonard not only to testify on the shared
links between the two sets of documents in question, but also to offer his opinion
that “the Q documents [were] consistent with the language patterns found in the
documents known to have been written by [the defendant].”168 Moreover, the
court rejected the defendant’s assertions that Leonard’s methodology was
unreliable under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,169 highlighting
that Leonard’s methodology was peer-reviewed, “accepted and relied upon by
federal courts in major cases,” and “based on sufficient facts and data.”170 While
the court noted the “robust debate among academics regarding best practices for
authorial attribution,” it determined that a “debate in the scientific
community . . . is not a basis for exclusion,” and therefore that any issues with
Leonard’s testimony should go to the weight of his opinion rather than to
admissibility.171 Observing that “[o]ther federal courts have rejected efforts to
exclude expert testimony on the basis that the forensic stylistics approach is
unreliable,” the court denied the defendant’s motion to exclude Leonard’s
opinion testimony.172
Despite the lack of definitive precedent, law enforcement investigators now
commonly utilize forensic linguistic evidence to provide a profile of the speaker
or writer, 173 while forensic linguists valiantly argue for greater inclusion in
court.174 Thus, “specialism in forensic linguistics . . . is [still] a relatively recent
trend, with an increasing amount of research attention being paid to the validity

165. Id. at 1354.
166. Id. at 1351; see also United States v. Van Wyk, 83 F. Supp. 2d 513, 520 (D.N.J. 2000) (“Fitzgerald
. . . arguably qualifies as an ‘observational’ expert . . . [and] qualifies as an expert in text analysis under the
flexible requirements of Daubert, Kumho, and Paoli II.”).
167. Kleiman v. Wright, No. 18-cv-80176, 2020 WL 6729362, at *32–34 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 16, 2020).
168. Id. at *32.
169. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
170. Kleiman, 2020 WL 6729362, at *33.
171. Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)
172. Id. at *34 (citing Dutcher v. Bold Films LP, No. 2:15-CV-110, 2019 WL 181353, at *1 (D. Utah Jan.
11, 2019)).
173. GIBBONS, supra note 25, at 307; see also Roger W. Shuy, To Testify or Not To Testify?, in LANGUAGE
IN THE LEGAL PROCESS 3–18 (Janet Cotterill ed., 2002).
174. See generally, e.g., Robert A. Leonard, Juliane E.R. Ford & Tanya Karoli Christensen, Forensic
Linguistics: Applying the Science of Linguistics to Issues of the Law, 45 HOFSTRA L. REV. 881 (2017);
Coulthard, supra note 27; Ainsworth, Who Wrote This?, supra note 15; Janet E. Ainsworth, Linguistics as a
Knowledge Domain in the Law, 54 DRAKE L. REV. 651 (2006); Peter Tiersma & Lawrence M. Solan, The
Linguist on the Witness Stand: Forensic Linguistics in American Courts, 78 LANG. 221 (2002); Lawrence M.
Solan & Peter M. Tiersma, Authorship Identification in American Courts, 25 APPLIED LINGUISTICS 448 (2004);
see also Samuel Larner, Forensic Linguistics, in THE PALGRAVE HANDBOOK OF APPLIED LINGUISTICS
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 703, 705 (Aek Phakiti et al. eds., 2018) (“As such, there is now a strong research
tradition surrounding the most appropriate ways to produce linguistic evidence . . . .”).
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and reliability of methods in authorship analysis.”175 Yet there remains a gaping
divide between theoretical linguistics and forensic linguistics, and “it is not
always possible to judge forensic testimony against ordinary practices among
linguists, because linguists do not ordinarily engage in the activities that generate
the expert testimony.”176 Even so, new technology and the rise of the internet
have led to a greater interest in computerized solutions to forensic authorship
identification.177
III. CRITIQUING THE THEORY OF
FORENSIC LINGUISTICS: IDIOLECT
The recent development of forensic linguistics tells the story of how
forensic science has capitalized upon linguistics’ loss of autonomy and failure
to produce a unifying theory explaining language. Linguistics’ status as a hard
science is increasingly unsure, and the discipline has shifted back into the realm
of the social sciences, evidenced by the rise of pragmatics, stylistics, and
discourse analysis. But the history of forensic linguistics also illustrates “the real
difficulty in applying the Galileian model[:] . . . [t]he more central [a]re features
to do with the individual, the more impossible it bec[omes] to construct a body
of rigorously scientific knowledge.”178
The fact that forensic linguistics stems from the breakdown of the
generativist theory seems almost natural, because generative linguistics
addressed the language-user in a most contradictory way. On one hand,
Chomsky argued that linguists should unlock the individual language-user’s
cognitive language faculties while advocating abstract theories that
fastidiously ignored variation and treated language strictly as a formal system.179
The language-user was therefore at the heart of a paradox that on one hand
depended on the individual for research but allowed him “no real effect on the
foundations of linguistics. Though pretending to take him into account,
linguistics ignores him.”180
Applying linguistic methodologies in court further exacerbates the tensions
already inherent in the discipline. On one hand, linguistic applications can only
maintain their academic and scientific respectability by crafting robust

175. Larner, supra note 174.
176. Lawrence M. Solan, Intuition Versus Algorithm: The Case of Forensic Authorship Attribution, 21 J.L.
& POL’Y 551, 561 (2013).
177. Rui Sousa-Silva, Computational Forensic Linguistics: An Overview of Computational Applications in
Forensic Contexts, 5 LANG. & L. 118, 119 (2018).
178. Carlo Ginzburg & Anna Davin, Morelli, Freud and Sherlock Holmes: Clues and Scientific Method,
9 HIST. WORKSHOP J. 5, 19 (1980).
179. Raffaele Simone, The Language User in Saussure (and After), in HISTORICAL ROOTS OF LINGUISTIC
THEORIES 233, 234–35 (Lia Formigari & Daniele Gambarara eds., 1995).
180. Id. at 235; see also LAKOFF, supra note 2, at 8 (“Traditionally linguistics has been unwilling to consider
the processes by which we understand larger and more abstract units of language (text or discourse) as a part of
a speaker’s knowledge of language . . . .”).
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theoretical solutions to more global questions about language.181 On the other
hand, practical linguistic applications can answer real-world problems, but fail
to meet the requisite threshold of reliability by inherently focusing on
variation.182 Forensic linguistics seeks to tether its methods to a general theory
of language 183 but takes these tensions to even greater extremes by using
linguistic methods to appropriate a strictly forensic, individual-centric theory,
idiolect.
A. THE THEORY OF IDIOLECT
Forensic linguistic methodology rests upon the theoretical assumption of
“linguistic fingerprinting,” or that each individual’s speech has uniquely
idiosyncratic, identifiable linguistic “impressions.”184 While the fingerprinting
analogy may be an overstatement, 185 “[a]uthorship attribution . . . has always
worked on the assumption that . . . one can discriminate texts by
analyzing . . . language differences [that] would point to different authors,” and
that “an individual’s language use can be determined and described by
identifiable features.” 186 Put differently, forensic linguistics rests upon the
assumption that “language users have individual preferences and habits that
determine their use of language.”187
Idiolect backs the practice of linguistic experts who compare two sets of
writing samples, an undisputed sample against the disputed sample, to identify
any linguistic differences and similarities that might surface shared,
idiosyncratic linguistic features unique to the author of the disputed
document.188 Linguistic experts might look, for example, to lexical density and
richness, syntactic and morphological patterns, and deep structure to draw
similarities between two documents that seem substantially unique.189 Experts
then measure these idiosyncratic features against interwriter differences190 to
gauge the uniqueness of the idiosyncrasy and evaluate whether it
manifests the author’s idiolect.191 However, “[t]here is still no empirical method
for demonstrating that each person has his or her own idiolectal variation that is
181. Simone, supra note 179, at 234 (“[Non-]user-centered theories are viewed as . . . formal, being able to
use formalisms apt to make the procedures of analysis rigorous and full-fledged.”).
182. Id. (“The main inconvenience with the user is that he intrudes a typical factor of disturbance, from
which theoretical linguistics has always striven to stay off—variation.”).
183. Carole E. Chaski, Best Practices and Admissibility of Forensic Author Identification, 21 J.L. &
POL’Y 333, 342 (2013) [hereinafter Chaski, Best Practices].
184. Coulthard, supra note 27, at 431–32 (emphasis omitted).
185. Id. at 432.
186. Eilika Fobbe, Text-Linguistic Analysis in Forensic Authorship Attribution, 9 J. LANG. & L. 93, 95
(2020).
187. Ainsworth, supra note 15, at 1165.
188. M. Teresa Turell & Núria Gavaldà, Towards an Index of Idiolectal Similitude (or Distance) in Forensic
Authorship Analysis, 21 J.L. & POL’Y 495, 495–96 (2013).
189. Id. at 496–97.
190. Id. at 496.
191. SOLAN & TIERSMA, supra note 8, at 167.
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uniquely identifiable, [and] author identification merely has to recognize
intrawriter vs. interwriter variation strong enough to differentiate authors from
each other.”192
B. IDIOLECT, STATISTICS, AND THE CORPUS
There are powerful critiques of current approaches to forensic authorship
attribution. While academic programs in forensic linguistics have increased over
the years, these programs seldom offer sophisticated education in linguistics.
“As a result, much of the linguistic training comes in the context of methods that
might seem useful in forensic analysis . . . .”193 Yet another problem is that there
is still no established consensus on where to focus the idiosyncrasy inquiry,194
whether by analyzing stylemarkers, vocabulary richness, the occurrence of
function words, sentence-length, word tokens, syntactic structure, or a
combination of factors and approaches.195 Forensic linguist Carole Chaski has
suggested that “abstract syntactic structures can differentiate between authors
and identify documents from one author,” excluding potential authors from the
pool based on failing statistical differentiation.196 Chaski’s statistical approach
has been criticized, however, and it is dangerous for linguists to dabble in
statistical testing without any formal training. 197 Similarly, corpus modeling
requires a certain level of statistical expertise lacking in current corpus
studies,198 and stylometry has been attacked for misappropriating statistics and
falling prey to the source fallacy.199

192. Chaski, supra note 183, at 348–49.
193. Solan, supra note 151, at 24.
194. Id. at 28.
195. See generally, e.g., Frederick Mosteller & David L. Wallace, Inference in an Authorship Problem: A
Comparative Study of Discrimination Methods Applied to the Authorship of the Disputed Federalist Papers,
58 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 275 (1963); G. Udny Yule, On Sentence-Length as a Statistical Characteristic of Style
in Prose: With Application to Two Cases of Disputed Authorship, 30 BIOMETRIKA 363 (1939); R. Harald Baayen
& Antoinette Renouf, Chronicling the Times: Productive Lexical Innovations in an English Newspaper,
72 LANG. 69 (1996); Carole Chaski, Who Wrote It? Steps Toward a Science of Authorship Identification,
233 NAT’L INST. JUST. J. 15 (1997); E. Stamatatos, N. Fakotakis & G. Kokkinakis, Computer-Based Authorship
Attribution Without Lexical Measures, 35 COMPUTS. & HUMANS. 193 (2001); Shlomo Argamon-Engelson,
Moshe Koppel & Galit Avneri, Style-based Text Categorization: What Newspaper Am I Reading? (1998)
(unpublished manuscript), https://www.aaai.org/Papers/Workshops/1998/WS-98-05/WS98-05-001.pdf; see
also Chaski, Best Practices, supra note 183, at 349.
196. Chaski, supra note 143, at 516 (internal citation omitted).
197. Larner, supra note 174, at 711.
198. HANS LINDQUIST & MAGNUS LEVIN, CORPUS LINGUISTICS AND THE DESCRIPTION OF ENGLISH 37
(2018).
199. GIBBONS, supra note 25, at 303–04; Jonathan J. Koehler, Linguistic Confusion in Court: Evidence from
the Forensic Sciences, 21 J.L. & POL’Y 515, 537 (2013); Joseph Rudman, The State of Authorship Attribution
Studies: Some Problems and Solutions, 31 COMPUTS. & HUMANS. 351 (1998). Still other studies have produced
results that undermine the idiolect hypothesis. See, e.g., Max M. Louwerse, Semantic Variation in Idiolect and
Sociolect: Corpus Linguistic Evidence from Literary Texts, 38 COMPUTS. & HUMANS. 207, 217 (2004) (“In sum,
for some authors[] similarity in content can be found . . . [but] [f]or other authors texts differ within one
author.”).
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Moreover, the data churned out by corpus linguistics studies can vary
tremendously depending on research design, and current tools are still behind.200
There are also bitter debates over what makes a truly representative corpus201
and how large the corpus must be to achieve accurate results—particularly a
problem in authorship attribution cases, where the initial dataset, such as a
ransom note, is limited.202 And does frequency really indicate individuality to
the exclusion of all else,203 in light of the haunting Chomskyan critique that a
finite corpus can never represent all language use, making common
constructions seem to occur less frequently in the chosen set than in actual
use?204 Lastly, there is the danger of confirmation bias. While intuition might
indicate that identifying a sufficiently wide range of unusual linguistic features
between two sets of documents would produce accurate results,205 some studies
have shown that applying a subset of selected features fares better,206 meaning
that “[w]ithout a predefined algorithm, an expert runs the significant risk of
preferencing aspects that confirm her initial hypothesis over those that disprove
it.”207
C. IDIOLECT, HISTORY, AND THE COURTS
Idiolect and the focus on corpus-centered approaches reveal that forensic
linguistics aligns more closely not with linguistics—whose history underscores
the uneasy tensions in forensic linguistics’ user-centeredness—but with the
work of literary and textual criticism identifying the authorship of the
works of Homer, Shakespeare, and even the Federalist Papers. 208 Frederick
Mosteller and David Wallace’s study distinguishing the stylistic features of
Madison and Hamilton’s writing in the Federalist Papers illustrates the modern
corpus linguistics techniques forensic linguistics seeks to exploit.209
But as the case of the Unabomber demonstrates, studies of literary or highly
stylized writings may be inherently easy to identify even without turning to
200. Laurence Anthony, A Critical Look at Software Tools in Corpus Linguistics, 30 LINGUISTIC RSCH. 141,
144 (2013); Donald L. Drakeman, Is Corpus Linguistics Better Than Flipping a Coin? 109 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 81,
84 (2020).
201. TONY MCENERY & ANDREW HARDIE, CORPUS LINGUISTICS: METHOD, THEORY AND PRACTICE 2
(2012).
202. GRAEME KENNEDY, AN INTRODUCTION TO CORPUS LINGUISTICS 62, 66 (1998).
203. PAUL BAKER, SOCIOLINGUISTICS AND CORPUS LINGUISTICS 19 (2010) (Paul Kerswill & Joan Swann
eds., 2020) (“Frequency is the bedrock of corpus linguistics.”).
204. MCENERY & WILSON, supra note 18, at 75; see also DYLAN GLYNN & KERSTIN FISCHER,
QUANTITATIVE METHODS IN COGNITIVE SEMANTICS: CORPUS-DRIVEN APPROACHES 11 (2010) (“There is, in
reality, no such thing as a balanced corpus and no corpus can ever hope to be representative of a language.”).
205. Solan & Tiersma, supra note 174, at 458–59.
206. See, e.g., Farkhund Iqbal, Rachid Hadjidj, Benjamin C.M. Fung & Mourad Debbabi, A Novel Approach
of Mining Write-Prints for Authorship Attribution in E-Mail Forensics, 5 DIGIT. INVESTIG. S42, S44 (2008).
207. Edward K. Cheng, Being Pragmatic About Forensic Linguistics, 21 J.L. & POL’Y 541, 550 (2013).
208. MALCOLM COULTHARD, ALISON JOHNSON & DAVID WRIGHT, AN INTRODUCTION TO FORENSIC
LINGUISTICS: LANGUAGE IN EVIDENCE 152–53 (2d ed. 2017); Chaski, supra note 183, at 333 (“Forensic
computational linguistics developed out of linguistic theory and computational linguistics.”).
209. See generally Mosteller & Wallace, supra note 195.
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rigorous statistical, linguistic methods. In fact, that is how such texts have been
identified for centuries before linguistics was an autonomous discipline that
could lend its methods to forensic authorship attribution. Similarities might
therefore surface not because of idiolect, but because a highly stylized document
like a manifesto or a ransom note may naturally, and perhaps even purposely,
rely on a repeating set of linguistic features. Perceived similarities or differences
may therefore reflect genre, topic selection, and style rather than an
individualized authorial footprint.210 Put still in other terms:
[I]t remain[s] unclear how a linguistic element acquires its stylistic value[,]
. . . reveal[ing] a lack of differentiation between language and style. . . . The
problem with automated systems is not their method of feature extraction or
evaluation but the underlying theory of style, which still cannot provide a
sufficient explanation of how a feature’s frequent occurrence in itself points
to an individual author.211

On the intrawriter end, this problem persists when comparing a highly
stylized piece of writing such as a ransom note with average samples of the
suspect’s writing. That certain linguistic features like word choice or syntactical
phrasing are present in both samples may neither manifest idiolect nor
conclusively identify a single authorial source. To the contrary, the comparison
may be meaningless, because when the writings are so different, it may be just
as likely that the match is wholly coincidental. 212 And if, as historian Carlo
Ginzburg identifies, there are significant, qualitative differences between the
contrived piece and the natural, minute details which best reflect individuality,213
overlap may not say anything meaningful about a common source.
Returning once more to the example of the Unabomber, Lakoff pointed out
in her supporting affidavit that “when two people write about the same
thing, the words they use are likely to overlap.”214 However, the Unabomber’s
unconventional usage of the idiom “eat one’s cake and have it,” while at first
thought to be a shared idiosyncrasy between Kaczynski and the terrorist, was in
fact occasionally used in the press.215 Chaski thus admits that “there are still no
empirical data supporting the essential claim of forensic stylistics that each
individual has a cluster of stylemarkers which is different from everyone
else’s, actually unique to individuals.”216 She admits further that “even if one
subscribes to the existence of individual style, it does not necessarily mean that

210. Chaski, supra note 183, at 338 (“Research that focuses on literary classics or edited newspaper articles
may develop accurate methods, but these methods must be tested on forensically feasible data before they are
borrowed across-the-board for forensic authorship identification.”).
211. Fobbe, supra note 186, at 95–96.
212. See Hitt, supra note 150 (“[I]t can be tricky to compare different genres of even a single person’s
writing.”).
213. Ginzburg & Davin, supra note 178, at 11.
214. SOLAN & TIERSMA, supra note 8, at 162.
215. Id. at 161–62.
216. Chaski, supra note 143, at 515.
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it has to be always detectable or would always develop an individualizing
function.”217
It is significant, then, that forensic linguistics turns primarily to the theory
and techniques of the recently disgraced forensic identification sciences rather
than to theoretical linguistics. Like other forensic identification sciences,
forensic linguistics often starts with drawing similarities from experience, the
rudimentary method behind handwriting and fingerprint analysis.218 Again, the
case that launched forensic linguistics, the case of the Unabomber, represents
the era in which forensic linguistic evidence was offered purely on an anecdotal,
experiential basis.219 Even now, while forensic linguistics claims to rely upon
linguistic techniques, it often simply hides behind linguistics’ name and
academic status while turning to statistical modeling analogous to
DNA matching. 220 Moreover, using corpus linguistic techniques to identify
similarities and differences does not sterilize the process from relying on
experience, because experts must still choose markers by which to gauge
uniqueness.
In this respect, critiques leveled at forensic linguistic evidence in
the authorship identification context mirror those leveled at
forensic handwriting expertise.221 This may seem surprising, given that forensic
linguistics is accompanied by a greater sense of legitimacy than recently
discredited forensic graphology. 222 Yet as the case law indicates, “[f]orensic
stylistics developed out of traditional forensic handwriting identification.” 223
While linguistics far outdates the use of linguistic evidence in court, linguistic
authorship identification is more forensic than we might think. Indeed, the
“linguistic” theory of idiolect directly replicates the methodology of interwriter
217. Fobbe, supra note 186, at 98.
218. See generally Jonathan J. Koehler, Fingerprint Error Rates and Proficiency Tests: What They Are and
Why They Matter, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1077 (2008); Mnookin, Scripting Expertise, supra note 26; Jennifer L.
Mnookin, Fingerprint Evidence in an Age of DNA Profiling, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 13 (2001); Simon A. Cole,
Fingerprinting: The First Junk Science?, 28 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 73 (2003); D. Michael Risinger & Michael
J. Saks, Science and Nonscience in the Courts: Daubert Meets Handwriting Identification Expertise, 82 IOWA
L. REV. 21 (1996); Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, The Individualization Fallacy in Forensic Science
Evidence, 61 VAND. L. REV. 199 (2008); see also SVARTVIK, supra note 141.
219. Coulthard, supra note 27, at 433; SOLAN & TIERSMA, supra note 8, at 163.
220. See Dale A Nance, Naturalized Epistemology and the Critique of Evidence Theory, 87 VA. L.
REV. 1551, 1610–12 (2001); Chaski, supra note 143, at 516–18; Shuy, supra note 11.
221. See, e.g., United States v. Van Wyk, 83 F. Supp. 2d 515, 522 (D.N.J. 2000) (“Various judicial decisions
regarding handwriting analysis, while not identical to text analysis, are instructive because handwriting analysis
seems to suffer similar weaknesses in scientific reliability, namely the following: no known error rate, no
professional or academic degrees in the field, no meaningful peer review, and no agreement as to how many
exemplars are required to establish the probability of authorship.”).
222. See Mnookin, supra note 26, at 1791.
223. Chaski, supra note 183, at 333 (citing GERALD R. MCMENAMIN, FORENSIC STYLISTICS 45–46 (1993));
see also Throckmorton v. Holt, 180 U.S. 552, 567–70 (1901) (holding witness opinion testimony on composition
and style to corroborate familiarity with handwriting inadmissible). But see State v. Kent, 74 A. 389, 390–91
(Vt. 1909) (noting punctuation similarities and differences in a hand-carving comparison); United States v.
Pheaster, 544 F.2d 353, 371–72 (9th Cir. 1976) (permitting a comparison of spelling errors between handwriting
exemplars to identify the defendant).
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and intrawriter similarities in handwriting analysis.224 Thus, both history and
current forensic linguistic identification techniques reveal that forensic
linguistics was wholly constructed in court.225
But while the forensic identification sciences have generally fallen from
grace,226 with increasing interest in sophisticated computational techniques for
matching text samples, reasons for excluding forensic linguistic evidence over
non-expert alternatives may appear less cogent. This in turn may lead
judges to assess the evidence on the “sliding scale” of reliability Jennifer
Mnookin suggests,227 tending to support her contention that reliability fails to
exist exogenous to the law and is instead constructed by it.228 At the same time,
Daubert continues to present a formidable hurdle to forensic linguistic evidence
in authorship identification cases, which, when parading under the mantle of
science, must produce reliable results through sufficient testing in the case at
hand.229 The new algorithmic model of forensic linguistic evidence thus faces
the significant challenge of whether it can consistently produce superior results
to the commonsense inferences of experience.230 But even beyond that, as this
Note demonstrates, the tangled history of the study of language challenges
whether any amount of analysis or research can conclusively trace why and how
people use language in the way that they do. Therefore, perhaps the best any
language expert can do is merely point out similarities and differences.231
Robert Leonard, a professor at Hofstra University and mentee of Roger
Shuy’s,232 is one of the most frequently appearing linguistic experts in recent

224. Mnookin, supra note 26, at 1805–06.
225. Id.
226. See generally Conor Friedersdorf, CSI Is a Lie, THE ATLANTIC (April 20, 2015),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/04/csi-is-a-lie/390897/; Michael J. Saks, Merlin and
Solomon: Lessons from the Law’s Formative Encounters with Forensic Identification Science, 49 HASTINGS
L.J. 1069 (1998); EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT: FORENSIC SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL COURTS: ENSURING SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF FEATURECOMPARISON METHODS (2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp
/PCAST/pcast_forensic_science_report_final.pdf.
227. Mnookin, supra note 26.
228. Id. at 1728–29.
229. 509 U.S. 579, 590–95 (1993); Solan, supra note 151, at 28–29.
230. Solan, supra note 151, at 29.
231. See Chaski, supra note 143, at 518; Koehler, supra note 199, at 539 (“Source claims . . . should be
avoided. Such a modest approach will not only help forensic linguistics gain a place in the courtroom, but it will
also reduce the risk that jurors will overweigh this potentially important, but as yet untested, evidence.”). Indeed,
this currently seems to be the prevailing approach taken by courts. See e.g., People v. Coleman, 24 N.E.3d 373,
402 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014) (allowing the expert to testify on similarities without offering an opinion on the ultimate
issue of authorship); United States v. Zajac, 748 F. Supp. 2d 1340, 1353 (D. Utah 2010) (same); United States
v. Van Wyk, 83 F. Supp. 2d 515, 523–24 (D.N.J. 2000) (same). But see Kleiman v. Wright, No. 18-cv-80176,
2020 WL 6729362, at *32 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 16, 2020) (permitting the expert to offer an opinion that shared
language patterns in a set of documents “[were] consistent with the language patterns found in the documents
known to have been written by [the defendant]”).
232. Hitt, supra note 150.
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case law.233 Leonard took the stand in 2012 in a case where the defendant, Brian
Hummert, was charged with strangling his wife.234 Among the evidence offered
against Hummert were a string of letters and a death note left by an alleged
stalker whom Hummert claimed had committed the murder.235
As an expert witness, Leonard testified about Hummert’s prose style, noting
the rare use of . . . “ironic repetition” . . . [and] a linguistic habit that, Leonard
testified, he had found nowhere else: a tendency to use contractions in negative
statements . . . but not in positive ones. . . . The jury was out for forty-five
minutes and returned a verdict of guilty.236

The jury verdict was affirmed on appeal,237 and at the close of 2020, the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania unanimously and summarily denied Hummert’s
petition for review. 238 While other circumstantial evidence strongly linked
Hummert to the murder, the intermediate appellate court’s opinion noted that
“[Hummert’s] attempt to blame his wife’s murder on a fictional stalker that he
created demonstrated his consciousness of guilt.”239
CONCLUSION
The history of forensic linguistics reveals that forensic linguistic evidence
in the authorship identification context—as with the rest of the forensic
identification sciences—suffers from the shared assumption of identifiable
individual idiosyncrasy, for which there may be no real scientific basis.240 While
hiding behind linguistics’ scientific status, forensic linguistics instead aligns
itself with literary authorship attribution. But as linguistics’ modern turn
demonstrates, the discipline’s scientific status may be tainted, and its history
suggests that the questions forensic linguistics claims to unequivocally answer
are just as contentious, unsettled, and unknown as ever. Forensic linguistics’
“wishlist” is a widely adopted, predefined algorithm; a large, random sample

233. See D.H. Pace Co. v. Aaron Overhead Door Atlanta LLC, 526 F. Supp. 3d 1360, 1365 (N.D. Ga. 2021)
(testifying on trademark genericness); Lodestar Anstalt v. Bacardi & Co., No. 2:16-cv-06411, 2019 WL
8105378, at *8 (C.D. Cal. July 3, 2019) (similar); PODS Enters., Inc. v. U-Haul Int’l, Inc., No. 8:12-cv-01479T-27MAP, 2014 WL 12628664, at *1 (M.D. Fla. June 27, 2014) (same); Apple, Inc. v. Amazon.com Inc., No.
C 11-1327, 2011 WL 2638191, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 6, 2011) (same); Nat’l W. Life Ins. Co. v. W. Nat’l Life
Ins. Co., No. A-09-CA-711, 2011 WL 840976, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 3, 2011) (similar); Kleiman, 2020 WL
6729362, at *32–34 (offering expert testimony in an authorship identification case); Ragbir v. United States, No.
17-1256, 2019 WL 9522419, at *29 (D.N.J. Jan. 25, 2019) (testifying on whether a written confession was a
verbatim transcript); Babos v. Welch, No. 3:09 CV 908, 2017 WL 9673713, at *12 (N.D. Ohio, Oct. 27, 2017)
(offering expert testimony in a voice identification case); United States v. Chaudhry, No. 06-771, 2007 WL
9725142, at *3 (D.N.J. July 30, 2007) (offering expert testimony on an IM-messaging dialogue).
234. Hitt, supra note 150.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Commonwealth v. Hummert, 237 A.3d 454, 454 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2020).
238. Commonwealth v. Hummert, 240 A.3d 875 (Pa. 2020) (per curiam).
239. Hummert, 237 A.3d at 454.
240. Saks & Koehler, supra note 218, at 202.
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of known exemplars; and a proven theory of language use.241 But as history has
shown, this is a wishlist the most brilliant minds of academic linguistics have
sought and failed to attain for the field generally.
“In a social structure of ever-increasing complexity like that of advanced
capitalism, befogged by ideological murk, any claim to systematic knowledge
appears as a flight of foolish fancy.”242 The modern page of linguistic history
seems to affirm this view, with its interdisciplinary dilution and failure to
generate an all-encompassing theory of language. It may seem ironic that
“scientific investigation accepts more uncertainty than does the legal process,
since it is the legal system’s assumption that scientific knowledge is crisp and
factual that makes it attractive in the first place. Nonetheless, that is often the
case.”243 Or perhaps what this brief historical survey reveals is that the applied
sciences are simply far less reliable than we think:
Our desire to idealize science runs, I fear, rather deep; we do not actually want
science to be muddy, complex, pragmatic, methodologically imperfect and
messy. When the science offered in court is all of these things, as it so often
is, we therefore tend to blame the science itself, rather than our own unrealistic
desires.244

The history of linguistics reveals what the discipline’s forensic variant has
failed to solve: the ongoing quandary of whether interpreting human
communication is a scientific or humanistic enterprise, and whether “the
methods and perspectives of those very different discover systems [can] be
welded together into a harmonious whole that yields reliable results.”245 More
simply and poignantly put, perhaps no theory can “reliably” account for what is
the “strangeness, beauty, and import of human speech.”246

241. Cheng, supra note 207, at 545.
242. Ginzburg & Davin, supra note 178, at 27.
243. Lawrence M. Solan, The Forensic Linguist: The Expert Linguist Meets the Adversarial System, in THE
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(internal citation omitted).
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245. LAKOFF, supra note 2, at 10.
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